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We model growth in dictatorships facing each period an endogenous
probability of “political catastrophe” that would extinguish the regime’s
wealth extraction ability. Domestic capital exhibits a bifurcation point
determining economic growth or shrinkage. With low initial domestic cap-
ital the dictator plunders the country’s resources and the economy shrinks.
With high initial domestic capital the economy eventually grows faster than
is socially optimal.
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Non-technical Summary
It is well known that some dictatorships achieve rapid economic growth while
others suffer rapid decline. Indeed, the growth rates of dictatorships vary unusually much
compared to democracies. This paper is apparently the first attempt to explain this
unusual variability in a formal economic framework.  We can explain both rapid growth
and decline in terms of optimal survival strategies for dictators in different circumstances.
The economy evolves over time with a dictator determining public capital
investment in every period.  Political stability, i.e., the probability that the dictator
survives from period t to period t+1 is increasing in the capital stock.  The idea is that the
dictator allocates the benefits of new projects so as to consolidate his power; more capital
to spread around means more political stability.  The dictator takes for himself and his
elite group a fixed fraction of all consumption in the economy.  His objective is to
maximize the discounted present value of his group’s consumption while he remains in
office.  We contrast the dictator’s behavior to that of a social planner where the former
does not care about economic performance after he loses power while the latter does.
Our first result is that there are only two possible qualitative paths for the capital
stock:  steady growth or steady deterioration .  Intuitively, capital deterioration decreases
stability, worsening conditions for capital investment, leading to further deterioration.
On the other hand, an opposite virtuous circle underlies steady growth with mirror-image
intuition.  The second result is that there is  steady growth when the economy begins with
enough domestic capital and steady deterioration otherwise , i.e., there is a “development
trap” according to which an initial domestic capital below a threshold “bifurcation point”
is insufficient to allow take off.  Third, we compare the dictator’s behavior with a social
planner’s, finding that  when dictatorships grow they grow faster than is optimal , i.e.,
faster than a social planner would choose.  We believe these results illuminate rapid-
growth-at-all-costs experience of many countries including Asian Tigers.  The intuition is
that dictators with good survival chances impose rapid growth to further prolong their
power.  On the other hand, less stable dictatorships often shrink when social planners
would choose to grow.
Many people argue that dictatorship offers the best hope for rapid growth in poor
countries, often citing the experience of Asian Tigers in support.  Others see no economic
benefit in dictatorship (see the survey in Przeworski and Limongi (1993)).  Our research
indicates that we should indeed expect some dictatorships to grow rapidly, but we should
also expect many to decline rapidly.  We predict no systematic tendency toward rapid
growth in dictatorships.  In other words, democracies might not grow faster than
dictatorships on average but they are generally a safer bet.  Second, even in cases when
dictatorships do grow rapidly our model suggests that this performance is not optimal
from a social point of view.  In other words, citizens of Asian Tigers may have sacrificed
too much in support of government policy so these countries are not good examples to
follow.
Next, we analyze how the bifurcation point between deterioration and growth
depends on underlying parameters. It is decreasing in the dictator's discount factor and
the initial level of political stability. These results make sense; a more patient or stable
dictator should be more willing to pursue growth than a less patient or stable dictator. The
bifurcation point is also decreasing in the depreciation rate, i.e., faster depreciation2
presents an increased threat to political stability that our dictators address directly through
an enhanced tendency to grow. Increasing the penalty to the dictator for losing power
also decreases the bifurcation point; since growth stabilizes the dictator's position, a
strong fear of losing power is a positive factor for growth. Another way to view the same
result is that dictators who are skimming a large fraction of their economy's consumption
are more willing to grow than those who are skimming less because the former have
more to lose from leaving office than the latter. This fits well with the theory of
dictatorships developed in McGuire and Olson (1996) and particularly Olson (2000),
according to which a dictator with a more ``encompassing'' interest, i.e., one who is
taking a larger fraction, will be more willing to promote growth than one with a less
encompassing interest.
We present some empirical evidence in favor of our model. Using the Barro-Lee
data set (Barro (1996)) we show that countries rated to have low political rights (Gastil
(1990)) vary much more in their growth rates than high political rights countries.
Moreover, the former are much more likely to experience either rapid growth or decline
than the latter. These results are broadly consistent with our results comparing dictatorial
with social planner outcomes. Third we show, consistent with our bifurcation result, that
the low political rights countries that decline tend to start with lower per capita GDP than
those that experience rapid growth.
This work fits broadly into the vast economic growth literature surveyed in Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1994).  To our knowledge our paper is the first rational choice model
of the effect of dictatorship on growth.  Barro (1996) argues that a moderate degree of
dictatorship may be good for growth in poor countries.  Olson (1993) argues that unstable
autocrats will plunder their countries.  Our results are in agreement for very unstable
autocrats but not for slightly unstable ones.  We predict that the latter would push for
rapid growth.
We conclude that choices made by dictatorships facing instability will often vary
from choices predicted by standard growth models involving benevolent social planners.
Good policy analysis should acknowledge the realities of dictatorships. Failure to do so
may contribute to the mixed success of foreign aid programs (Delong, 1997, Hirschman,
1981).  As one step toward explicit thinking about dictatorships, our paper provides a
novel perspective on how dictatorships may respond to aid. In our framework decreasing
corruption actually yields lower growth, while decreasing a dictator's anticipated out-of-
power utility is good for growth. These results are due to the fact that the larger is the
difference between a dictator's in-power and out-of-power utility, the greater is his
determination to retain power and hence to encourage economic growth. This logic
suggests that the international community focus more effort on reducing the comfort of
dictators who have lost power, for example by freezing bank accounts and by prosecuting
human rights violations, rather than on reducing the corruption of those who hold power.
General Pinochet's recent experience in London may be good for growth in the
developing world.
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Sah (1991) likens the choice of dictatorship to that of a risky asset because some
grow very rapidly while others fail miserably. Robert Barro, in “Getting It Right,”
(1996b, p.3), expresses the similar view that dictators
“come in two types: one whose personal objectives often con‡ict
with growth promotion and another whose interests dictate a preoc-
cupation with economic development....The theory that determines
which kind of dictatorship will prevail is missing.”
We actually provide such a theory. The dictators in our model come in exactly
the two types Barro proposes. One forces a growth rate that is too high relative to
the social optimum. The other type presides over stagnation or even plunders the
economy into the ground. The determination of dictatorial type is endogenous.
That is, we provide an intuitively appealing theory that determines whether a
dictatorship grows or declines and that compares its performance with optimal
behavior, …nding a particularly high variability in growth rates in dictatorships.
Political instability is a major impediment to economic growth in a wide variety
of countries.1 Instability, implying risk, limits investments and hence growth.
This is recognized in the academic political economy literature in which models
often include some form of political instability (i.e., Alesina and Tabellini, 1990;
Grossman and Noh, 1990, 1994; Bertocchi and Spagat, 1997). Moreover, since
physical capital is becoming increasingly mobile across countries and regions, the
role of political instability in economic decision making is increasing as foreign
investment and capital ‡ight respond ever more sensitively to changes in countries’
political environments.2
While the above considerations are standard, in this paper we introduce the
more novel assumption that domestic capital development contributes to political
stabilization while domestic capital deterioration causes political destabilization.
1According to de la Balze (1995), “Among the group of …fteen most advanced prewar nations,
Argentina distinguished itself ... with the greatest political instability of the postwar period”
(p. 4). Of course Argentina is famous for its economic decline during this long period of
political instability. Other examples abound; Somalia, Haiti and the countries that comprised
the former Yugoslavia are recent examples of the economic catastrophe that attends extreme
political instability.
2Sachs and Warner (1995) demonstrate that global capital mobility has been growing rapidly
in recent years, on its way to a return to the level it had attained in 1900.
3The idea underlying this relationship is that domestic capital development in-
creases the number and in‡uence of individuals with an interest in the continuance
of the current political status quo, stabilizing the system.3
The dictator in our model maximizes the discounted present value of his own
consumption while he remains in o¢ce. His stochastic and endogenous survival
process is determined by political stability, which evolves over time.4 We contrast
the dictator’s behavior with that of a social planner. There are two di¤erences
between the two decision makers. First, the dictator su¤ers a penalty if he loses
power while the latter is indi¤erent to political upheavals. Second, the dictator’s
behavior is driven by the fraction of output he skims o¤, while in the socially
planned economy nothing is skimmed o¤ and the planner is concerned with overall
consumption.5
Our …rst result is that in dictatorships there are only three possible qualitative
paths for domestic capital: steady growth, steady decline, or zero growth, a knife-
edge case.6 In particular, a “U-shape” scenario under which domestic capital …rst
deteriorates and then reverses course cannot occur. There is a straightforward
intuition underlying this result. Domestic capital deterioration decreases stabil-
ity, worsening the conditions for domestic capital investment, leading to further
deterioration, completing a vicious cycle. Under these conditions the dictator ag-
gressively plunders the country’s resources, even while realizing that in doing so
he hastens his departure from power and, hence, his ability to continue extract-
ing wealth. The key insight here is that in an unstable environment the dictator
expects to remain in power for only a short period, regardless of his strategy, so
plundering dominates investment.
3Bertocchi and Spagat (2000) provide microfoundations for this assumption. We discuss this
in more detail in sections 2.5 and 2.8.
4Our notion of dictatorship corresponds closely to the concept of “tinpot dictatorship” de-
veloped in Wintrobe (1990, 1998). Wintrobe’s tinpot dictator takes as much wealth as possible
subject to staying in power. We do not claim this is the only interesting kind of dictatorship.
Wintrobe also emphasizes what he calls “totalitarian dictatorships” which strive to maximize
their power. We do believe that there are not many dictatorships that do not display a signi…cant
tinpot element.
5We will refer often to the dictator as taking a fraction of the economy’s consumption, but
we do not think of the dictator taking only for himself. Rather, we think of the dictator as
representing some elite group with the whole of the elite group bene…ting from the taking.
6All of the results described below are based on computational analysis. Later we describe
our procedures and the range of parameters checked. All the claims in this section are very
robust.
4On the other hand, there is a self-reinforcing cycle underlying steady growth
that has mirror-image intuition: domestic capital growth increases stability, im-
proving the conditions for increased domestic capital investment leading to further
growth, completing a virtuous circle. In this case, the dictator is restrained in his
wealth extraction to lengthen the time he will enjoy the bene…ts of continued
power. In particular, more investment leads to more stability, extending the dic-
tator’s e¤ective time horizon.
A central and related result is that if the economy begins with su¢cient do-
mestic capital to promote political stability there is steady growth; otherwise,
there is steady deterioration. In other words, there is a critical level of domestic
capital which we will refer to as a “bifurcation point”: an economy below this
level …nds itself in a development trap whereas one above the threshold follows a
plan of steady growth.7
Next, we analyze how the bifurcation point depends on the underlying para-
meters. It is decreasing in the dictator’s discount factor and the initial level of
political stability. These results make sense; a more patient or stable dictator
should be more willing to pursue growth than a less patient or stable one.8 The
bifurcation point is also decreasing in the depreciation rate, i.e., faster deprecia-
tion presents an increased threat to political stability that our dictators address
directly through an enhanced tendency to grow. Increasing the penalty to the dic-
tator for losing power also decreases the bifurcation point; since growth stabilizes
the dictator’s position a strong fear of losing power is a positive factor for growth.
Another way to view the same result is that dictators who are skimming a large
fraction of their economy’s consumption are more willing to grow than those who
are skimming less because the former have more to lose from leaving o¢ce than
the latter. This …ts well with the theory of dictatorships developed in McGuire
and Olson (1996) and particularly Olson (2000), according to which a dictator
with a more “encompassing” interest, i.e., one who is taking a larger fraction, will
be more willing to promote growth than one with a less encompassing interest.
The shape of the policy function, giving the fraction of output consumed as
a function of domestic capital, is of interest. The consumption fraction follows
two possible paths. On the …rst it starts high, eventually falls and then once
again increases. On the other path it falls even at low values of capital and then
7See Azariadis and Drazen (1990) and Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1989) on development
traps.
8Although Robinson (1998) reaches the opposite conclusion on patience. We will comment
more on this later.
5rises. This indicates that at an early stage of development dictatorships increase
their saving rates as they grow richer. This result provides insight into the rapid
growth experience of the Asian Tiger economies that did indeed have declining
consumption rates during their takeo¤ phases (Mankiw, Romer, and Weil, 1992).
We then explore the di¤erences between the dictator’s and social planner’s
behavior. The most glaring distinction is that the social planner does not ex-
hibit bifurcation. In fact, for the parameters we consider the social planner
always grows.9 Next, for su¢ciently high domestic capital dictatorships grow
(sub-optimally) faster than their corresponding social planner economies. The
intuition is that a dictator expects high growth rates to prolong his tenure in
power. Thus, when a dictator chooses growth, he will eventually choose rapid
growth in order to increase the longevity of his rule.10 This …ts with empirical
evidence that democracy may actually slow growth (Barro, 1996a). On the other
hand, dictatorships below the bifurcation point shrink when, with the same en-
dowment, social planners grow. This reveals a tendency for dictators to plunder
their countries’ wealth when their hold on power is insecure. We also …nd that the
variability of growth rates for our dictators is higher than for our social planners.
These results have interesting connections with some common ideas on growth
and dictatorship. First, one often encounters the view that corrupt regimes have
a strong tendency to decline.11 But, within our framework this is not necessarily
the case. Below the bifurcation point our regimes, which are by nature corrupt in
the sense that they appropriate national wealth for themselves, do indeed decline
rapidly. But su¢ciently above bifurcation they grow very rapidly. This is not to
9Of course, there are circumstances in which it can be optimal for the economy to shrink,
e.g., if time discounting is very strong, but we normally do not consider these to be interesting
cases.
10De Long (1997, ch.2) shows that from the 1960s many dictatorships in the non-Communist
fringe of Paci…c Asia and in Saharan Africa have experienced rapid growth.
11Barro (1996a) states: “... the e¤ects of an autocracy are adverse, however, if the dictator
uses his or her power to steal the nation’s wealth....” Bardhan (1997) writes, “when public
resources meant for building productivity-enhancing infrastructure are diverted for politicians’
private consumption... growth rates obviously will be adversely a¤ected.” De Long (1997)
lists a group of countries that did not follow the above-bifurcation growth path in which “...the
average person is probably poorer in absolute terms than their counterparts back in 1965...” This
group includes Mozambique, Togo, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Senegal, Ghana, Zaire (now Republic
of Congo), Uganda, Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, El Salvador, Peru, Nicaragua, and Jamaica. De
Long attributes these countries’ steady decline to “Government by Thieves” or “kleptocracy” –
situations where the leaders have “sacri…ced economic development and the long-run interests
of all to the short run interests of a relative few” (ch. 21, p. 3).
6say that our results would support a view that dictatorships are socially optimal.
In fact, our model dictatorships do not choose socially optimal growth rates, but
they may experience especially rapid growth. A second common view is that
insecure dictators will tend to plunder their economies into decline (e.g. Olson,
1991, 1993). Again, this is true only below bifurcation in our model. It is true
that instability leads to what we call a “horizon-shortening e¤ect” that operates
against growth in all cases. But at the same time there is also an “endogenous-
survival e¤ect” that works in the opposite direction. Since rapid investment shifts
to the right the probability distribution over the dictator’s time in power, there is
a tendency for overinvestment by moderately insecure dictators. In other words,
a desire to stabilize his position might lead a dictator to favor rapid growth.
Finally, we present some empirical evidence in favor of our model. Using the
Barro-Lee data set (Barro, 1996a) we show that countries rated to have low polit-
ical rights (Gastil, 1990) vary much more in their growth rates than high political
rights countries.12 Moreover, the former are much more likely to experience either
rapid growth or decline than the latter. These results are consistent with our
theoretical results comparing model dictatorships with social planner outcomes.
Moreover, this section moves forward the large literature surveyed in Przeworski
and Limongi (1993) that has asked whether or not dictatorships grow faster than
democracies on average but has yielded only inconclusive results. While democ-
racies may or may not have faster average growth rates than dictatorships they
certainly seem to be a much safer bet for steady growth. Finally, we show, consis-
tent with our bifurcation result, that the low political rights countries that decline
tend to start with lower per capita GDP than those that experience rapid growth.
Wintrobe (1990, 1998) provides a general theory of dictatorships of all possi-
ble types. The main concern in this pathbreaking work is how dictators maintain
power through the use of repression, economic growth and distribution of rents.
Although we do not consider repression here, our idea of stabilization through
growth, underpinned by the enhanced opportunities for co-optation of poten-
tial opposition that growth a¤ords, are very much along the lines of Wintrobe’s
thinking.13 However, Wintrobe’s analysis does not delve into the dynamics of the
growth process and, therefore, is unable to do, e.g., the sorts of comparisons be-
12Lucas (1988) points out that growth rates tend to be far less stable in developing countries
than in established democracies, but the growth literature has not followed up on this idea. In
our model the characteristics of a dictator, or more generally of the ruling group, determine
growth paths so replacement of one group with another could switch a country from decline to
rapid growth or vice versa.
13See Spagat (1999) for a dynamic model of repression.
7tween the growth rates of dictatorships and social planners that feature centrally
in our work.
Marcouiller and Young (1995) provide an interesting static model of a preda-
tory state showing how, through general equilibrium e¤ects, the threat that eco-
nomic activity will withdraw into the informal economy to avoid corrupt taxation
can be very weak. They give circumstances under which it can be rational for
a dictator to tax the formal sector very heavily while simultaneously providing
virtually no public goods. This work is, however, concerned solely with negative
outcomes and also does not study dynamics.
Robinson (1998) studies the question of whether states promote development
or simply prey o¤ the population. The key tradeo¤ in this work is that develop-
ment expands the pie from which a state can siphon o¤ resources but also can
make it easier for opposition to organize against the state. A good example of the
issue is building roads; roads are good for development but also can be used for
subversive activity. Interestingly, in this theory patient dictators can be among
the least development-oriented because they are the most averse to the possible
future political destabilization that public investment could cause. We believe
this work gives very important insights, particularly into the large number of cor-
rupt regimes that have stagnated and deteriorated over time. However, we also
think that many important cases …t into our complementary approach that treats
growth as stabilizing rather than destabilizing.14 In fact, many Asian regimes
in particular seem to derive their legitimacy mainly from their ability to deliver
economic growth.
Feng and Zak (1998, 1999) study the transition from dictatorship to democ-
racy. In the present paper a political catastrophe can just as easily be a transition
from one dictatorship to another as from dictatorship to democracy. Moreover, we
focus more on the behavior determined by the desire to avoid catastrophe than on
the actual occurrence of catastrophes. Nevertheless, there is an obvious overlap
in the two approaches.
Grossman and Noh (1990, 1994) model a dynamic and endogenous survival
process for what they call a proprietary regime, although they are concerned
with taxation issues rather than growth. Papers starting with Perotti (1993),
Alesina and Rodrik (1994), and Persson and Tabellini (1994) combine politics
and growth, although they all work within a democratic framework with majority
voting and study the e¤ects of inequality. There are various other non-growth
but dynamic political economy models. Dewatripont and Roland (1992) and
14See Section 2.8 for further discussion.
8Rodrik (1996) focus on the political economy of transition and policy reform,
inherently dynamic contexts. Our focus on growth, the dangers of overthrow and
the dictator’s incentives is thus complementary to these other studies.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In section two we present the model.
Results are presented and analyzed in section three. We give some evidence for
our theory in section four and conclude in section …ve.
2. The Model
2.1. Production






where Kt is domestic and non-mobile capital and Jt is foreign and fully-mobile
capital at time t respectively and where t = 1;2;::: is measured in discrete inter-
vals. We think in terms of a broad concept of domestic capital that goes beyond
traditional physical capital to include physical infrastructure (roads, bridges, tele-
phone lines etc.), market infrastructure (stock, bond, and derivatives markets,
banks, a functioning legal system etc.), and human capital. Foreign capital is
complementary to domestic capital and includes such factors as advanced tech-
nology, sophisticated physical capital and modern managerial skills – factors of
production not readily available in the domestic economy.
2.2. Foreign Investment
We assume a small open economy, i.e., foreign investment ‡ows into or out of
the country until its domestic return is equal to a …xed world rate of return, ½:15
Therefore ½ = @Ft
@Jt = º (1 ¡ ®)J
¡®
t K®
t . Solving for Jt yields
Jt =
Ã





15The foreign investment ensures constant returns to domestic capital. Some such device is
appropriate to abstract away from returns-to-scale phenomena and focus solely on how outcomes
may derive from the nature of dictatorships. Alternatively, in-country production could be
assumed to have a constant returns production function with no foreign investment.
92.3. The Rate of Return on Domestic Capital

















Since it turns out that wt does not vary over time, we de…ne w ´ wt so as not to
unnecessarily carry the t subscript through all the calculations. Gross domestic
earnings are wKt and are decreasing in the world rate of return. Note that




t = wKt + ½Jt.
2.4. Domestic Capital Development
Let Ct denote consumption and de…ne investment as It where It ´ wKt¡Ct. The
di¤erence equation governing domestic capital evolution is
Kt+1 = (1 ¡ ±)Kt + It; (2.4)
where 0 · ± · 1 is the rate of decay of capital. This formulation builds some
persistence into the domestic capital stock while requiring investment if the stock
is to be maintained or increased.
2.5. Political Catastrophes
A key feature in the model is that in every period there is an endogenous prob-
ability of a political catastrophe that removes the dictator from power. The
catastrophe probability in period t is given by
qt = q (Kt) = min( e
´+µKt;1) (2.5)
where µ < 0.16 This is the probability that the dictator is not in power during year
t+ 1 given that he was in power during year t. Thus, the transition out of power
occurs at the end of year t. In the computations ´ is chosen so that ´+µKt < 0 for
all plausible values of Kt: The idea is that as domestic capital grows the number
16Of course, probabilities must be between zero and one, hence the use of the minimum
operator.
10and in‡uence of people who have a stake in preventing a catastrophe grow and,
therefore, the catastrophe probability decreases. This is intuitive. As human
capital, physical infrastructure and market infrastructure grow, the number of
people with high earning power under the current regime also grows. These people
and interests will naturally wish to prevent catastrophes.17
2.6. Objective of the Policymaker
We are interested in the behavior of a dictatorship concerned with the portion of
domestic consumption it takes in every period up until a catastrophe point – if
one occurs. The dictator chooses the split of output between consumption and
investment, but not the fraction of consumption he appropriates. Consumption






1¡¾ if ¾ 6= 1 and in power
ln(¸Ct) if ¾ = 1 and in power





where ¾ ¸ 0 is the coe¢cient of relative risk aversion. The last line re‡ects the
key fact that the dictator is penalized for losing power. Umin and ¸ are taken as
a parameters that are varied in the computations to re‡ect di¤erent penalties for
losing power. Umin in the computation is chosen so that for any reasonable capital
stock the utility in power is higher than utility out of power.
Assuming a discount factor of 0 < ¯ < 1 and subject to equations 2:1 ¡ 2:6,













where ¿ is a random variable with range f1;2;:::g giving the stochastic and en-
dogenous time when the catastrophe occurs. An equivalent formulation for the
problem is
17A companion paper by Bertocchi and Spagat (2000) establishes microfoundations for this
assumption based on the notion that development enhances a dictator’s ability to co-opt po-
tential opposition through spreading wealth around. Alternatively, we studied a variant of the
model in which consumption replaces capital in the catastrophe function. This e¤ectively makes
the population extremely myopic. Most, but not all, of our qualitative results still hold in this


























(1 ¡ q(K¿)) is the endogenous probability that the dictator is in power
at time t and 1¡
t Q
¿=1
(1 ¡ q(K¿)) is the endogenous probability that the dictator
is not in power at time t.
Next, as a basis for comparison, we consider the problem of a benevolent social
planner. This problem coincides with the dictator’s problem, but with one key
di¤erence; the social planner does not view political catastrophe as terminating
high utility. The di¤erence between the criteria of the social planner and the
dictator is that the dictator weighs a given future period’s utility by the proba-
bility of avoiding catastrophe up to that point, while the social planner takes into
account the path of the economy after catastrophe. After a political upheaval,
the economy continues on with di¤erent leadership but still provides utility to the









where U (Ct) =
(
(Ct)1¡¾
1¡¾ if ¾ 6= 1
ln(Ct) if ¾ = 1
)
:
One way to understand the di¤erence between (2.7) and (2.9) is that the sum
in the former runs from 0 to the random ¿ (with utility Umin thereafter) while the
latter runs with certainty to 1. Equation (2.8) seems to suggest that the possi-
bility of political catastrophe, and hence the termination of the dictator’s reign,
acts simply to intensify time discounting. Although there is some truth in this it
misses the most crucial point about the model; the dictator’s survival probability
is endogenously determined. Thus, our formulation allows the dictator, in e¤ect,
control over discounting: a factor that is the key to our analysis.
2.7. Dynamic Programming Formulation





[1 ¡ q (K)]V
d([1 ¡ ±]K + I) + q (K)Vmin
o
(2.10)
12Equation (2.10) just says that the value V d to a dictator of a given level of domes-
tic capital, having avoided catastrophe this period, is the utility of consumption
plus the value of the resultant domestic capital next period discounted by ¯ and
the probability of avoiding catastrophe plus the value of losing power times its
probability also discounted by ¯. It is well known that this formulation is equiv-
alent to (2.7).
Similarly, the Bellman equation for the social planner is
V
p (K) = max
0·C·wK U (C) + ¯V
p ([1 ¡ ±]K + I): (2.11)
2.8. Discussion of the General Set-up
To elucidate the meaning of political catastrophe, we o¤er the following examples.
Communist revolutions would always qualify as political catastrophes, because
they curtail the ability of the overthrown elite to enjoy the bene…ts of power.
An electoral defeat of a ruling party may or may not qualify. The key question is
whether defeat leads to a substantial cut in the party’s ability to extract resources
from the economy. In democracies transfers of power often do involve substantial
shifts in political patronage lines. When these are large our model can give in-
sights into the situation. A good example would be the Russian election of 1996
when if Gennadi Zyganov had defeated Boris Yeltsin this would have constituted
a political catastrophe achieved through democratic means. When democratic
transfers of power do not have strong …nancial implications for the party in power
we would not consider them political catastrophes and this paper would not have
much to o¤er. Most elections in mature democracies would tend to have this
character. Thus, political catastrophe, as we de…ne it, is not synonymous with
revolution although revolutions typically would be political catastrophes. Some
democratic transfers of power can satisfy our de…nition. The key requirement is
that there must be a major decrease in ruling elites’ ability to extract resources.
Next consider our workinghypothesis thatmore domestic capital causes greater
stability. Might it not be more sensible to posit that public pressure punishes a
dictator for deviating too far from the behavior of a social planner rather than
for not building a large enough capital stock? It might be sensible for a homoge-
nous public to establish a survival probability for a dictator that decreases in the
distance of economic policy from optimality. However, consider the following mi-
cro underpinning for our hypothesis. At the beginning there are two groups, an
elite group (the dictator’s people) and a non-elite group (people who would like
13to overthrow the dictator). Imagine the probability of overthrow is an increasing
function of the size of the non-elite group. Now suppose the elite co-opts, e.g., by
transferring some wealth, some members of the non-elite into joining a third group
that is politically neutralized, i.e., that does not actively oppose the dictator. It
is intuitively plausible that the wealthier is the elite the larger will be the fraction
of the non-elite the former is able to co-opt. That is, a larger capital stock at the
disposal of the elite will allow it to buy more political stability.18
Of course, this cannot be considered an iron law of nature. In certain situations
rapid growth may be destabilizing (see Olson, 1963; Robinson, 1998). However,
note that the overthrow of an autocrat following an episode of rapid growth does
not necessarily mean that the growth was a destabilizing factor. For example,
before World War I when Russia was experiencing rapid growth Prime Minister
Stolypin initiated his “wager on the strong and sober,” a policy that brought
ambitious peasants into the middle class. Lenin greatly feared this policy, opining
that “if this should continue for very long periods of time ... it might force us
to renounce any agrarian program at all.” (Moorhead, 1958, p. 69). Within
the framework of our model we can see the rapid growth as a survival strategy
re‡ecting the insecurity of the tsar who simply was not su¢ciently fortunate
to hang on long enough to achieve full stability. In fact, taking seriously the
stochastic nature of our survival process we should expect a certain number of
cases like Russia that experience rapid growth and then political catastrophes;
they just should not be the typical case. Indeed, Przeworski et. al. (1996) and
Przeworski and Limongi (1997) show that growing dictatorships are much less
likely to democratize than shrinking ones, i.e., on average growth tends to be
stabilizing for dictatorships.19
18Bertocchi and Spagat (2000) formalizes this argument.
19Of course, this is not to say that Olson (1963) and Robinson (1998) are wrong. There may
be, e.g., a useful way of taking a sub-sample of the large sample used in Przeworski et. al. (1996)
and Przeworski and Limongi (1997) that would not display the characteristic that growth is a
stabilizing force.
143. Results
3.1. The Basic Approach
The problem is too complicated to yield an analytical solution so we solve it
numerically.20 Table one gives the parameter values included in the computations.
Our goal was to be as realistic as possible. For standard parameters we used
typical values from the growth literature. In fact, everything is entirely standard
except for the parameters of the catastrophe function, which does not have any
close counterpart in any established literature we know of. For this reason we
ranged over a large number of parameters for the catastrophe function. There are
a total of 432 parameter sets. We give details of the computational procedure in
the appendix. Table 1 gives the computational grid.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
3.2. Dependence on Initial Domestic Capital – Bifurcation
In 429 out of the 432 cases there is a bifurcation point for domestic capital in the
solution to the dictator’s problem. That is, in these cases if initial domestic capital
begins above some level
¡
K, then it will always increase, but if domestic capital
begins below
¡
K it will always decrease. The remaining 3 cases involve growth even
for very low values of K. As …gure 1 shows, most of the bifurcation points are in
the range between $1 billion and $10 billion. The values of K shown range from
$.1 billion to $1 trillion, and the horizontal axis is logarithmic, with each interval
indicating a multiple of ten in K. The plot is very slightly smoothed (otherwise it
would consist of spikes) using kernel density methods, with 201 points and a kernel
half-width of 0.025, ensuring that the …ne structure of the distribution remains
apparent.21
20It is well known that deterministic Cass-Koopmans growth models yield analytical solutions
only for a handful of special functional forms. Not only does our model have uncertainty,
but the stochastic component enters in a non-standard and deceptively di¢cult way with the
randomness depending on the endogenous capital stock. This makes the model very di¢cult to
handle analytically.
21Forty-two cases display bifurcation at points o¤ the graph, all between $.05 billion and $.1
billion.
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The main reason for this behavior is captured by the following mechanism. If
initial domestic capital is low the dictator has a low probability of retaining power
for very long. Thus, it is pointless to invest and, therefore, he allows the capital
stock to deteriorate while he plunders the economy. This is consistent with the
idea that insecure dictators do not favor growth (Olson, 1991, 1993). On the other
hand, if initial domestic capital is relatively high the dictator can look forward to a
long reign in power and therefore will wish to invest, further delaying his expected
departure date. In this case, the dictator’s strategy is to restrain his plundering in
exchange for increasing his time in power. Thus, moderate insecurity is consistent
with economic growth. Clague et. al. (1996) show empirically that dictators who
are in power for a long time are more restrained in their plundering, in the sense
that they give more respect to property and contract rights, than those who are
in power for a short period of time.
The following proposition further develops the bifurcation intuition.
Proposition 3.1. Suppose the dictator’s value function, V d(K) in equation 2.10,
is strictly concave and di¤erentiable. Then if the capital stock in period t + 1 is
(weakly) larger than the capital stock in period t; the capital stock in any period
¿ > t will always be (weakly) larger than the capital stock in period ¿ ¡ 1.
Conversely, if the capital stock in period t+1 is (weakly) smaller than the capital
stock in period t;the capital stock in any period ¿ > t will always be (weakly)
smaller than the capital stock in period ¿ ¡ 1.
Proof. Suppose Kt+1 ¸ Kt but, contrary to the proposition, Kt+2 < Kt+1. This
would imply that Ct+1 > Ct: Note that the solution to the maximization problem
on the RHS of the Bellman equation (2.10) must be an interior solution. Consider
the …rst order conditions for this solution at both time t and time t+1. They are
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leads to a contradiction. Therefore if the capital stock ever increases it can never
again decrease.
16The proof of the claim that once capital shrinks it continues to shrink is a
mirror image of the above argument.
The computations indicate that the dictator’s value function is strictly con-
cave only for 50 of the 432 parameter sets tested so the proposition is of limited
applicability. On the other hand, the computed value functions are nearly always
concave at su¢ciently low and high values of K (all but about 25 are strictly
concave near K=$.1 billion and all are strictly concave near K=$1 trillion) so the
proposition does provide insight for all of the cases.22
If we interpret K as human capital then this bifurcation result has an interest-
ing connection with the issue of human capital investment in Russia. It is often
argued that human capital should be allowed to deteriorate temporarily at an
early stage in Russia’s transition process while other more pressing concerns are
attended to.23 According to this view human capital growth could resume after
stability has been achieved. But the present model suggests that such a U-shaped
scenario might not be a feasible path for Russia.
3.3. Bifurcation Sensitivity and Parameter Choice
The computations yield the following unambiguous results on how the bifurcation
point, when it exists, responds to changes in underlying parameters. The bifur-
cation point is decreasing in ¯, ¸ and ±. The …rst is the unsurprising result that
patient dictators are more development-oriented than impatient ones. An inter-
pretation of the second result is that the more lucrative it is to run the country
the more interested the dictator will be in growth because growth stabilizes his
position and creates a larger pie to steal from. The third indicates that rapidly
depreciating capital su¢ciently threatens political stability to produce a strong
growth inclination. The bifurcation point is increasing in Umin, i.e., dictators ex-
pecting a soft landing after losing power are less interested in growth than those
who expect to su¤er more when out of power. This is because growth is stabi-
lizing so the more determined is a dictator to hold power the more inclined he is
to foster growth.24 The bifurcation point is increasing in political instability (as
22Also, the computations employ a very strict concavity test that may sometimes indicate
lack of concavity as a result of computational inaccuracy, so the proposition may provide insight
even for some of the functions that fail the test in the regions in which they fail.
23For details see Overland and Spagat (1996) and Fan, Overland and Spagat (1999) who argue
against the common view.
24The results for ¸ and those for Umin are just di¤erent ways of presenting the same thing.
Since the solution to the problem does not change when the utility function is multiplied by a
17measured by q1($10 billion), see table 1) is bad for growth. The bifurcation point
does not respond systematically to changes in ¾ or to changes in µ and ´ that
hold q1 …xed.
The e¤ect of changing q1 may be of special interest if we consider that di¤erent
countries may have di¤erent q1’s due to exogenous factors. For example, one might
argue that Taiwan and South Korea in the 1950s were able to achieve higher
political stability at a similar level of development than was the Philippines, due
to higher equality resulting from land reform. The di¤erences in q1’s might have
put these countries on di¤erent sides of their respective bifurcation points, at least
for some time periods, resulting in the large di¤erences in per capita GDPs they
have achieved today.
3.4. The Dictator’s Policy Function
It is interesting to note the non-monotonicity of the consumption fraction as a
function of domestic capital (hence income). In most of the cases the consump-
tion fraction starts high, then falls, and then rises again. In the rest it decreases
even at low K and then rises. The reason for this behavior is closely connected
with the above discussion of bifurcation. If domestic capital is below the bifur-
cation point, then the optimal choice is to allow it to deteriorate. This implies
that an increase in domestic capital that does not push the economy above the
bifurcation point simply leads to higher current consumption. When the bifurca-
tion point is crossed, however, the basic plan shifts from plundering the economy
and extinguishing domestic capital to building it up. There is then an interval
of higher domestic capital levels over which improved conditions for investing in
domestic capital induce the policymaker to cut the consumption rate. The bifur-
cation point for an economy generally occurs near the beginning of this interval
of declining consumption. At even higher levels of domestic capital, the consump-
tion fraction once again begins to increase. This is consistent with the experience
of Asian tigers who increased their saving rates at early stages of industrialization
(Mankiw, Romer and Weil, 1992).
3.5. The Dictator Versus the Social Planner
The crucial di¤erence between the planner and the dictator is that the planner
does not exhibit bifurcation. In fact, for all the parameter values we used the
constant what really matters is the size of Umin relative to the other piece of the utility function.
18social planner chooses positive growth for any initial domestic capital stock. So
whenever our model dictatorships shrink it is always socially sub-optimal to do
so.
Next, when the dictatorial economy has an initial domestic capital level suf-
…ciently above its bifurcation point, it achieves a higher growth rate than the
comparable socially-planned economy, i.e., it grows faster than is socially optimal.
The intuition behind this result is that the dictator, but not the social planner,
cares about the probability of survival. This endogenous probability is increased
by heavy investment in domestic capital (equation 2.5). Thus, the dictator has a
unique incentive to push for a high growth rate.
It is, perhaps, surprising that there are any circumstances at all under which
the dictator outgrows the social planner. The dictator, in e¤ect, discounts the
future more than the planner because the former’s planning horizon is truncated
(stochastically) by the possibility that he will be removed from power. How is
it that the one who discounts the future most strongly invests the most? The
dictator can a¤ect his survival prospects through his investment strategy: more
investment leads to a longer expected term in o¢ce. Thus, the endogeneity of the
political catastrophe is the reason for high investment.25
These considerations can be clearly displayed in the following manner. First,
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where K2(C) = (1 ¡ ±)K+wK¡C and K3(C) = (1 ¡ ±)[(1 ¡ ±)K + wK ¡ C]+
w[(1 ¡ ±)K + wK ¡ C] ¡ Cd
2. This problem can be interpreted as choosing con-
sumption in period 1 subject to the constraints that the decision-maker will con-
sume Cd
2, the quantity the (optimizing) dictator would consume in period 2, and
then receive the continuation utility associated with the capital stock implied by
25Roberts and Rodriguez (1997) provide an interesting growth model for Soviet-type
economies. They explain why transition economies have invested much less than their cen-
trally planned parents by invoking a change in the applicable discount rate. But in our model
the planner and the dictator always have the same discount rate, strictly de…ned.
19his choice in period 1 and Cd
2. A solution to the planner’s problem starting from
















This problem can be interpreted as choosing consumption in period 1 subject to
the constraints that the decision-maker will consume C
p
2, i.e., the quantity the
(optimizing) social planner would consume, in period 2 and then receive the con-
tinuation utility associated with the capital stock implied by his choice in period
1 and C
p
2. These problems yield, for the dictator and social planner respectively,
the …rst order conditions
0 = U























It is clear, from comparing the third term in 3.5 with the second term in 3.6,
that for the dictator the marginal value of more capital next period is discounted
by the extra [1 ¡ q(K)]f1 ¡ q [K2(C)]g relative to the planner. This “horizon-
shortening e¤ect” argues for less investment. On the other hand, the dicta-
tor’s term ¯
2[1 ¡ q (K)]q0 [K2(C)]fV [K3(C)] ¡ Uming > 0 in 3.5 re‡ects an
“endogenous-survival e¤ect” that argues for more investment. It turns out that
the latter e¤ect dominates the former far enough above bifurcation.
The present result can be further understood by comparing typical dictators’
and planners’ policy functions as shown in …gure 2. The …gure compares the two
optimal functions using identical parameter values. Above bifurcation consump-
tion in the dictatorial economy falls to a level below that in the planner’s economy,
leading to faster growth. For high levels of domestic capital, policies of the dictator
and social planner converge because instability is extremely low (equations 2.10
and 2.11 demonstrate this mathematically). Indeed, when the threat of political
overthrow is tiny, the dictator and social planner become indistinguishable.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
20Figure 3 gives a picture of the distribution of capital stocks at which the
dictator’s consumption dips below that of the social planner ranging over all the
parameter values we studied. Note that the capital stocks required for the dictator
to outgrow the planner are not especially high; all of these “cut-through points”
are below $100 billion and 74% of them are below $10 billion. We also studied
the response of cut-through points to changes in underlying parameters and got
exactly the same qualitative results as we had for the response of bifurcation
points to parameter changes.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
The magnitude of cut-through is quite signi…cant. An average of 1.4 orders
of magnitude (686.8 grid points) within the range K = $.1 billion to $1 trillion
involved the dictator’s consumption strictly less than the social planner’s. The
various parameter sets ranged from 0.69 to 2.88 orders of magnitude (343 to
1441 grid points) in which the dictator’s consumption was lower over that range.
Among the values of K for which the dictator’s C was lower, the dictator on
average chose 26.1% less consumption than the social planner (with the mean
percentage below ranging from 2.8% to 52.3% for alternative parameter sets).
Again, among the values of K for which the dictator’s C was lower, the dictator
on average had a growth rate higher by 0.0044 (0.44% per annum) than the social
planner (with the amount higher ranging from 0.000017 to 0.0174 for alternative
parameter sets). The di¤erences in growth rates were much more pronounced
than these averages at values of K shortly after the cut-through.
Finally, we note that our model dictatorships display much more variability
in growth rates than do the model social planner economies. In particular, the
standard deviation of growth rates, ranging over all parameter values and a sam-
pling of 2001 logarithmically equally spaced initial Ks, (ranging from $.1 billion
to $1 trillion) is 13.1 for the dictator and 7.4 for the social planner. The high
variability for the dictator is due to strong policy response to varying K rather
than to response to changing parameter values.
4. Some Evidence
There is a large empirical literature on growth and political regimes surveyed in
Przeworski and Limongi (1993) and Sirowy and Inkeles (1990) concerned with
whether dictatorships are good or bad for growth. Both studies conclude that it
21would be very di¢cult to argue for a strong e¤ect either way. Some researchers
…nd mild results in one direction or the other while others …nd the e¤ects are
ambiguous. Barro (1996a) …nds some evidence that, while extreme dictatorships
may harm growth, softer dictatorships may actually be good for growth.
For the present paper the important point about these works is that they
concern average growth rates rather than some measure of the variability of the
rates. Our theory does not predict that growth rates would be either higher or
lower on average in dictatorships compared to democracies. But it does suggest
that some dictatorships would grow very rapidly while others experience sharp
decline. In other words, we would not be surprised to see dictatorships growing
like democracies on average but would expect highly variable growth rates in
dictatorships.
We tested this prediction using the Barro-Lee data set.26 For our limited
purposes this means that we are using the Summers-Heston data (augmented by
World Bank data when necessary) together with the annual ratings of political
freedom carried out by Gastil (1970-1990). The Gastil concept of political freedom
is mainly about the extent to which people are allowed to participate meaningfully
in political processes. To score very well a country would need genuinely contested
executive and legislative elections under fair conditions, regular shifts in power,
freedom from foreign or military control and no major oppression of minority
groups. The ratings are, of course, subjective in the …nal analysis but they do
generally accord with common sense.
We use data between 1970 and 1990 and calculate growth rates of real GDP
per capita over both 5-year periods (1970-75, 75-80, 80-85, & 85-90) and 10-year
periods (1970-80 & 80-90) for di¤erent exercises. We divide the countries into
high political rights countries (Gastil index < 3), middle rights countries (3 ·
index < 5) and low rights countries (5 · index · 7). This is done by averaging
for each country over the time period in question. Note that the political category
of a country can vary across time periods.
Table 2 gives the percent of observations in each political category that ex-
perience negative growth according to various de…nitions ranging from < 0% per
26The data together with a detailed description is available at
http://www.nber.org/pub/barro.lee. Barro (1996a) carries out a growth regression exer-
cise involving about 100 countries between 1960 and 1990, controlling for a large number
of factors. His …gure 4 (p. 15) shows the partial residuals of growth rates, controlling for
everything except political freedom, plotted against political freedom. Inspection of this picture
makes it fairly obvious that, consistent with our prediction, the variability of growth rates for
low freedom countries is quite a bit larger than that for high freedom countries.
22year to < ¡4% per year over a ten-year period. Thus, out of all high political
rights observations 18.8% did not grow on average over a ten-year period, 11.8%
declined faster than one percent per year, etc. The table clearly shows a much
higher prevalence of negative growth experiences for low political rights countries
than in high or middle rights countries. The results are the same if we use 5-year
averages. North America is the only region of the world that does not contribute
to the list of negative-growth-low-political-rights countries but the main contrib-
utors are Africa, the Caribbean and South America.
Table 2. % by Political Category with Various Negative Growth Rates
Political Rights g < 0% g < ¡1% g < ¡2% g < ¡3% g < ¡4%
High 18.8 11.8 4.7 2.4 0
Middle 31.1 20.0 11.1 6.7 4.4
Low 45.8 32.2 17.8 9.3 5.9
Now consider rapid growth as de…ned by annual rates over 10-year periods
averaging more than 4%, 5%, 6%, and 7% as given in table 3. Again we see
that rapid growth is more frequent in dictatorships than democracies, although
it is actually most common in the middle rights countries. The results are the
same with 5-year averages. The list of high-growth-low-political-rights countries
has representatives from every major region other than North America and the
Caribbean, but the East Asian presence is especially strong. Perhaps surprisingly
a fair number of African countries appear at least during certain time periods
(e.g., Kenya, Lesotho, Nigeria, Tunisia).
Table 3. % by Political Category with Various Rapid Growth Rates
Political Rights g > 4% g > 5% g > 6% g > 7%
High 10.6 7.1 2.4 1.2
Middle 22.2 15.6 6.7 2.2
Low 17.8 9.3 5.1 2.5
Since our theory predicts that dictatorship should be associated with both
very high and also negative growth rates one would expect that the variance of
the growth rate should be higher for low political rights countries than for high
ones. Table 4 con…rms this prediction.
23Table 4. Sample Variance in Growth Rates vs. Political Rights
Time Periods High Middle Low
5-year average 6.0 13.2 15.3
10-year average 4.4 8.7 10.8
Since political rights are positively correlated with income it is possible that
table 4 is really just picking up a tendency for poor countries to have more variable
growth rates than rich countries so we ran a regression to control for income. We
divided the countries into ten GDP per capita classes, 0¡2000; 2000¡4000; :::;and
18;000 ¡ 20;000 (designated 1; 2; ::; 10respectively). Next we subdivided each
income group into three subgroups for low, medium and high political rights (des-
ignated 1; 2; 3 respectively). Finally we calculated sample variances for growth
rates over …ve-year periods for each of these thirty groups. We got the follow-
ing result in which the GDP variable is insigni…cant and low political rights are
associated with high variance in growth rates.








Finally, we focus on our bifurcation result that suggests that in dictatorships
negative growth should be associated with low initial income and rapid growth
with high initial income. Table 5 is consistent with this prediction. In the table
the 1775 …gure, for example, is the average of the initial GDPs per capita of all
countries in the sample with growth rates above 4% per year for a 5-year period.
Table 5. Average Initial Per Capita GDP: Dictatorships with
Negative or Rapid Growth




The theory of dictatorship and growth presented in this paper provides an expla-
nation for an important outstanding puzzle: why dictatorships display unusually
high variability in growth rates. In the theory, dictators and elite groups who begin
with poor political survival prospects are likely to embark on a downward spiral of
24plunder and decline. Unlikely to remain in power long, they consume what they
can take rather than promote economic growth. Haiti, Iraq, Paraguay, Somalia,
Yugoslavia and Zaire seem to …t this pattern of economic decline. In contrast, dic-
tators and elite groups with better survival chances tend to choose especially rapid
growth, above the social optimum, to further enhance their longevity. Keeping
the economy booming tends to provide them with a long period in power during
which they can expect to bene…t. China, Ecuador, Indonesia, Lesotho, South
Korea, and Tunisia seem to …t this pattern of economic boom.
Indeed, choices made by dictatorships facing instability will often vary from
choices predicted by standard growth models involving benevolent social planners.
Good policy analysis should acknowledge the realities of dictatorships. Failure to
do so may contribute to the mixed success of foreign aid programs (Delong, 1997,
Hirschman, 1981).27 As one step toward explicit thinking about dictatorships,
our paper provides a novel perspective on how dictatorships may respond to aid.
In our framework decreasing corruption (lowering ¸) actually yields lower growth,
while decreasing a dictator’s anticipated out-of-power utility, Umin, is good for
growth. These results are due to the fact that the larger is the di¤erence between
a dictator’s in-power and out-of-power utility, the greater is his determination to
retain power and hence to encourage economic growth. This logic suggests that
the international community focus more e¤ort on reducing the comfort of dictators
who have lost power, for example by freezing bank accounts and by prosecuting
human rights violations, rather than on reducing the corruption of those who hold
power. General Pinochet’s recent experience in London may be good for growth
in the developing world.
Appendix: Solution of Optimal Policy Functions
Optimal policy functions for the dictator and social planner were computed for
a broad range of plausible parameter values. A value of capital of $10 billion was
chosen (without loss of generality) as the approximate value of a typical country’s
initial capital. A range from $0.1 billion to $1 trillion was then chosen as the
set of values of capital for which results would be examined. Possible parameter
values were chosen to yield values of production and other variables that match
approximately with available empirical information, particularly around K = $10
billion. Table 1 shows the values considered. Every possible combination of these
parameters was tried, yielding 432 sets of parameters.
27Wintrobe (1990, 1998) has already begun rethinking the relationship between dictatorships
and democracies along these lines.
25For each set of parameter values, the dynamic programming problem was
solved using a grid of possible values of capital. The grid was constrained to a
…nite set, which guarantees convergence for at least the social planner’s optimal
value function using Denardo’s contraction mapping theorem. To ensure that the
…nite constraints of the grid had little impact on the results, the constraints were
chosen to be two orders of magnitude below and above the range of results to be
examined. The grid used thus ranged from $0.001 billion to $100 trillion, with
4,001 grid points equally spaced in the logarithm of K (thus yielding 500 grid
steps per order of magnitude in K).
The usual method to converge on an in…nite-time-horizon optimal policy is
to start by assuming that for any value of K, society consumes all production
in a hypothetical future period. The computation process then works backward
in time, at each step computing for each value of K the optimal consumption
given the discounted future value computed so far for next period’s K (which
is uniquely determined by current K and consumption). The computation is
declared to have converged on an in…nite-time-horizon optimal policy when the
change in the contemporaneous value function, between the current and previous
time step, is less than ". We used " = 1:0 £ 10¡5, with the steps equal to 1 year,
and required that the convergence criterion be met for all points in the K-grid
before convergence would be declared.28
Denardo’s contraction mapping theorem guarantees convergence of the value
function but not of the policy function, and the theorem does not apply to the
more complex dictator’s case, so we checked whether the solution converged for
the policy function as well as the value function.29 For all cases the policy func-
tions as well as the value functions converged. To ensure adequate convergence,
an additional convergence criterion was required to hold before convergence was
declared. For each point in the K-grid, the optimal fraction of output consumed
had to di¤er by less than " from the value computed at the previous step, and
this requirement had to hold for an additional 50 consecutive steps. The extra
steps were required in case a small change in the value function at one step should
induce a large change in the optimal policy function computed at a next step for
28At each step we solved for optimal policy to within a tolerance of 1:0 £ 10¡6. Linear
interpolation was used between points on the K-grid to …nd values of functions of K between
points.
29Dynamic programming problems generally are solved for growth models with time-separable
value functions. In the present problem, the dictator’s value function is not time-separable: the
dictator’s decision in period t a¤ects the likelihood that he is in power in future periods, and
hence a¤ects his future value functions.
26some point on the K-grid; this sensitivity in computation was observed for some
parameter values and the 50 additional steps appeared to be more than adequate
to handle the sensitivity.
After solving for the optimal policy for a given set of parameters, it was neces-
sary to carry out further tests. To isolate bifurcation points in economic growth
for the dictator, we started with low and high values of K of $0.1 billion and $1
trillion respectively. The algorithm used initial working assumptions of negative
growth at the bottom of this range and positive growth at the top of the range,
and iterated by testing at the midpoint of the range to see whether growth was
negative or positive. The search continued at each iteration by testing the mid-
point between the highest point so far found to have negative growth and the
lowest point so far found to have positive growth. The search was stopped when
the di¤erence between the values of K considered was less than 0.005. If the search
stopped within 0.005 of the minimum or maximum of the range tried, positive or
negative growth respectively was declared to have occurred throughout the range.
In any case a more intensive search was carried out above and below the apparent
bifurcation point (or above the minimum or below the maximum if positive or
negative growth was declared) to ensure that the growth patterns indeed involve
a bifurcation with decline for values of K below the apparent bifurcation point
and growth for values of K above the apparent bifurcation point (or growth or
decline only if no bifurcation point was found). The search above (below) the
point found was carried out by …rst testing the value of K equal to 1.001 (0.999)
times the value of K at the point, then successively increasing the distance away
from the point by 10% per iteration until the full range from $0.1 billion to $1
trillion had been scrutinized.
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30Table 1.  Parameter Grid for Computations
Parameter Used for Units Values
a Production none 0.3333
q Catastrophe 1/(billion $) ln(.75), ln(.9), ln(.97)*
h Catastrophe none q 10 ln 1 - q , with 
1 q  = .05, .15, .3, .5**
d Depreciation 1/years .05, .1
s Utility function none 0.5, 1, 1.5
l Appropriation none normalized to 1 (but variations of  min U  are
analogous)
min U Utility function utiles )) 10 ( ( 0 2 1 = = K F a a U , where a 1  is a typical
consumption fraction and a 2  is a multiplier
to the dictator’s consumption when out of
power relative to when in power;  2 1 a a  =
.001, .01, .05
b Discount factor 1/years .90, .95
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, where  G  is a
typical national capital growth rate when
1/3 of output is invested,  G =.03
*The values for  q imply that if K increases from its initial value of 10 to a value of 11 billion dollars one
year later, the catastrophe probability falls by a multiple of .75 / .9 / .97, i.e. by 25% / 10% / 3%, over that
one-year period.
**The values of  h are computed after finding the value for  q, and are chosen such that q 1 , the probability of
catastrophe at the end of the dictator’s first year in power, is .05, .15, .3, or .5. Note that F(K 0 =10) in the





































Figure 2. Typical Dictator’s and Planner’s Policy Functions ($billion of
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